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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES;: 
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIA-
TION, CEDAR VALLEY PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY 
PUMPERS I INC. I 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; MILLY O. BERNARD, Chair-
man; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Corrunis-
sioner; and.DAVID R. IRVINE, 
Commissioner, 
Defendants. 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 
16891 
P.S.C.U. CASE NO. 
76-023-04 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants seek refund of the amount of the increase in 
rates for the period February 18, 1977 through May 23, 1978, 
granted C.P. National Corporation (an electric utility) pursuant 
to a February 18, 1977, order of the Public Service Com.mission 
which was subsequently reversed and remanded by the Utah Supreme 
Court on December 5, 1978. (Parowan Pumpers Ass'n. v. Public 
Service Com'n., 586 P.2d 407) 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
The Public Service Commission denied the requested refund. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order of this court requiring the 
Public Service Commission to determine the amount of the refund 
and to require c.P. National Corporation to refund said amount 
to the persons entitled thereto as required by Section 54-7-17(4), 
U.C.A. 1953. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In case no. 76-023-04 before the Public Service Commission, 
C.P. National Corporation (then California Pacific Utilities, 
hereinafter "C.P.", real party in interest herein) applied for 
an increase in the rates charged to its customers to recover, 
inter alia, annual rental expenses for a transmission line owned 
by Utah Power and Light Company. The transmission line had been 
constructed by Utah Power and Light Company and part of its 
capacity was to be used by C.P. to transmit power purchased from 
Utah Power and Light Company to C.P.'s customers. The line was 
constructed at an approximate cost of $4,400,000. The rental 
contract provided that C.P. pay Utah Power and Light Company 
rental expenses of $856,910 per year over a 45 year period. 
A reason advanced by respondent for requiring the new trans-
mission line was the obligation of C.P. to wheel power for the 
United States Bureau of Reclamation. 
The Parowan Pumpers Association appealed the order of the 
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Public Service Commission granting the increase for which refund is 
now requested. A stay of the effect of the order was not obtained, 
nor was a "suspending bond" filed with the Supreme court. In the 
decision in that case, this court summarized the facts as follows: 
After a number of public hearings on the 
proposed rate increase, the Commission found 
that both the wheeling agreement and the 
UP&L contract were required by law to be 
submitted to the Commission for its approval; 
that neither contract had been submitted, and 
had never been approved; that neither contract 
was in the best interest of the public or of 
the customers of Cal-Pac; that had Cal-Pac 
not been wheeling power for the Bureau the 
construction of this new transmission line 
would not have been necessary; that the Com-
mission had jurisdiction over the rates , . 
charged for all intrastate utilities including 
the wheeling rates; and that the Commission 
had the power to modify or amend the contracts. 
In its order, the Commission nevertheless 
granted 53.03% of the requested increase and 
ordered Cal-Pac to negotiate with the Bureau 
for an increase in the wheeling rate. 
The Commission's order is not supported 
by its findings, and in fact is hostile to 
them. The findings and order are irrecon-
cilable and that irreconcilability is fatal. 
The Commission found that the UP&L contract 
was not in the public interest but based a 
rate increase on the terms of that contract. 
The Commission found that the construction 
of the transmission line was not a necessary· 
expenditure for the purpose of supplying 
service to the customers of Cal-Pac but 
granted an increase which requires those 
customers to pay 53% of the cost of that 
construction. Also there is no finding that 
the increase granted is reasonable; on the 
contrary, the implication of the findings is 
that the incr~ase is not reasonable. 
As we are unable to correlate the find-
ings with the commission's order, we reverse 
and remand the case to the Commission to take 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such action, including further hearings, if 
necessary, as it deems advisable for the 
purpose of achieving a harmonious relation-
ship between its findings and order. 
(Parowan Pumpers Ass'n. v. Public Service Com'n., 
586 P.2d 407) 
Upon remand, both the Parowan Pumpers Ass'n. and the Corn-
mittee of Consumer Services (Appellants) petitioned the Public 
service Commission for an order requiring C.P. to refund to its 
Utah jurisdiction customers an amount equal to the new revenue 
collected from those customers pursuant to the reversed order of 
February 18, 1977. The period subject to the requested refund 
extends from February 18, 1977 to May 23, 1978, the date on which 
a new order establishing rates for respondent's Utah customers 
was entered.in case no. 77-023-08. (R-123) 
After consolidating case no. 76-023-04 with cases 77-023-05 
and 77-023-08, the Public Service Commission proceeded to hear 
evidence on some of the issues presented in those cases. 
Thereafter, the Commission entered its "Supplemental Report 
and Order' dated January 11, 1980, in case no. 76-023-04. In this 
"Supplemental Report and Order' the Commission determined that its 
reversed Order of February 18, 1977, "was inartfully drawn and was 
hastily issued under the pressures of a heavy caseload of hearings 
and paper work." (R-124, para. 4 of Findings of Fact) 
Having previously entered a finding that the rental expense 
contract ~ not in the public interest, the Public Service commis· 
sion in its "Supplemental Report and Order" made a finding that 
the rental expense contract was in the public interest. 
para. 5 of Findings of Fact) 
(R-124, 
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Based on this finding, the Commission "amended" its reversed 
order of February 18, 1977, "consistent" with its new finding that 
the rental expense contract was in the public interest. (R-125, 
Conclusions of Law). The rates established by the "amended" re-
versed order were then affirmed and the petition for refund was 
denied. (R-125, 126, of the Order). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED FOR REFUND 
TO CUSTOMERS OF REVENUES COLLECTED BY A 
PUBLIC UTILITY PURSUANT TO AN INVALID ORDER 
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. 
It is the contention of appellants that the Public Service 
Commission by state law had no alternative but to order a refund 
of revenues collected by C.P. pursuant to an order which was sub-
sequently reversed by the Supreme Court. 
Section 54-7-17, U.C~A. 1953~ specifically provides that 
revenues collected by a public utility under authority of an in-
valid order of the Public Service Commission are to be refunded 
to the customers from whom they are collected. This, and Section 
54-7-16 U.C.A. 1953, set forth the mechanics of obtaining such a 
refund. Application is made to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari (54-7-16). Pending the determination of the writ, the 
Supreme Court may stay or suspend the appealed order and may re-
quire that the disputed revenues be impounded by the court or 
-5-
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placed in a bank or trust company. When the Supreme Court has 
made its final decision (and in the event the appeal is successful 
the monies collected by the public utility under authority of the 
invalid order, together with interest if the disputed funds have 
been impounded in a bank or trust company, are to be refunded by 
order of the Public Service Commission to the persons from whom 
they were collected. 
The pertinent provisions contained in the indicated subsec-
tions of Section 54-7-17 are as follows (we reprinted the entire 
Section 54-7-17 for the convenience of the court at the end-of 
the argument on this Section) : 
(1) The pendency of a writ of review shall not 
of itself stay or suspend the operation of the 
order or decision of the commission, . 
(1) during the pendency of such a writ the Supreme 
Court in its discretion may stay or suspend, in 
whole or in part, __ the oper_ation of the cornmis-
sion' s order. 
(2) the order suspending the same shall contain 
a specific finding ... that great or irrepar-
able damage would otherwise result to the 
petitioner. 
(3) In case the order or decision of the com-
mission is stayed or suspended, the order of the 
court shall not become effective until a sus-
pending bond shall first have been executed and 
filed .. 
(3) The Supreme Court, in case it stays or sus-
pends the order or decision of the commission in 
any matter affecting rates, fares, tolls, rentals, 
c~arges or classifications, shall also by order 
direct the public utility affected to pay into 
court from time to time, there to be impounded 
until the final decision of the case, or into 
some bank or trust company paying interest on 
deposits, under such conditions as the court may 
-6-
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prescribe, all sums of money which it may 
collect from any person in excess of the sum 
~uch person would have been compelled to pay, 
if the order or decision of the commission 
had not been stayed or suspended. 
(4) Upon the final decision by the Supreme 
Court, all monies which the public utility 
may have collected pending the appeal in ex-
cess of those authorized by such final decision 
together with interest in case the court 
ordered the deposit of such monies in a bank 
or trust company, shall be promptly paid to the 
persons entitled thereto in such manner and 
through such methods of distribution as may be 
described by the commission. (emphasis added) 
Section 54-7-17 makes it obligatory that a refund be ordered 
in this matter. An order of the Public Service Commission author-
izing an increase in rates was "reversed" by the Supreme Court. 
Revenues collected by C.P. pursuant to that invalid order should 
be "promptly paid to the persons entitled thereto in such manner 
and through such methods of distribution as may be described by 
the commission." On remand, the Public Service Commission com-
mitted error in failing to comply with the requirements of this 
subsection (4) of Section 54-7-17. The entire text of Section 
54-7-17 is as follows: 
Stay pending~Conditions~Procedure~ 
Bond~Reparations.~ (1) The pendency of a writ 
of review shall not of itself stay or suspend 
the operation of the order or decision of the 
commission, but during the pendency of such writ 
the Supreme Court in its discretion may stay or 
suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of 
the commission's order or decision. 
(2) No order so staying or suspending an 
order or decision of the commission shall be 
made by the Supreme Court otherwise than upon 
three days' notice ,and after hearing, and, if 
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the order or decision of the commission is 
suspended, the order suspending the same 
shall contain a specific finding, based upon 
evidence submitted to the court and identified 
by reference thereto, that great or irrepar-_ 
able damage would otherwise result to the 
petitioner, and specifying the nature of the 
damage. 
(3) In case the order or decision of the 
commission is stayed or suspended, the order of 
the court shall not become effective until a 
suspending bond shall first have been executed 
and filed with and approved by the commission 
(or approved, on review, by the Supreme Court) 
payable to the state of Utah, and sufficient 
in amount and security to ensure the prompt 
payment by the party petitioning for the review 
of all damages caused by the delay in the en-
forcement of the order or decision of the 
commission, and of all moneys which any person 
or corporation may be compelled to pay, pending 
the review proceedings, for transportation, 
transmission, product, commodity or service in 
excess of the charges fixed by the order or 
decision of the commission, in case said order 
or decision is sustained. The Supreme Court, 
in case it stays or suspends the order or deci-
sion of the commission in any matter affecting 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or 
classifications, shall also by order direct the 
public utility affected to pay into court from 
time to time, there to be impounded until the 
final decision of the case, or into some bank 
or trust company paying interest on deposits, 
under such conditions as the court may prescribe, 
all sums of money which it may collect from any 
person in excess of the sum such person would 
have been compelled to pay, if the order or 
decision of the commission had not been stayed 
or suspended. 
(4) In case the Supreme Court stays or sus-
pends any order or decision lowering any rate, 
fare, toll, rental, charge or classification, 
the commission upon the execution and approval of 
such suspending bond shall forthwith require the 
public utility affected, under penalty of the 
immediate enforcement of the order or decision 
of the commission pending the review and notwith-
standing the suspending order, to keep such 
_o_ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accounts, v~rified by oath, as may in the judg-
ment of the commission suffice to show the 
amounts being charged or received by such public 
utility pending the review in excess of the 
charges allowed by the order or decision of the 
commission, together with the names and addresses 
of the persons to whom overcharges will be re-
fundable, in case the charges made by the public 
utility pending the review are not sustained by 
the Supreme Court. The court may from time to 
time require such party petitioning for a review 
to give additional security or to increase the 
said suspending bond whenever in the opinion of 
the court the same may be necessary to ensure the 
prompt payment of such damages and such over-
charges. Upon the final decision by the Supreme 
Court all moneys which the public utility may 
have collected pending the appeal in excess of 
those authorized by such final decision, together 
with interest in case the court ordered the de-
posit of such moneys in a bank or trust company, 
shall be promptly paid to the persons entitled 
thereto in such manner and through such methods 
of distribution as may be prescribed by the 
commission. If any such moneys shall not have 
been claimed by the persons entitled thereto 
within one year from the final decision of the 
Supreme Court, the commission shall cause notice 
to such persons to be given by publication, once 
a week for two successive weeks, in a newspaper 
of general circulation printed and published in 
the city and county of Salt Lake, and in such other 
newspaper or newspapers as may be designated by 
the commission; said notice to state the names of 
the persons entitled to such moneys and the amount 
due each person. All moneys not claimed within 
three months after the publication of such notice 
shall be paid by the public utility under the 
direction of the commission into the state treasury 
for the benefit of the general fund. (parts 
underlined are those quoted above) 
POINT II. 
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT "REVER-
SING AND REMANDING" THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION WAS A "FINAL DECISION" 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 54-7-17(4) 
Appellants contend that the decision of this court of 
December 5, 1978, reversing the order of the Public Service Com-
mission of February 18, 1977, was a "final decision" as contemplated 
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by section 54-7-17(4), and required the conunission to make a refunc 
to customers of C.P. of revenues collected pursuant to that 
reversed order. 
As set forth above, Section 54-7-17(4) provides for a 
refund of utility revenues collected pursuant to an invalid order 
of the Public Service Commission. This refund is to be made "upon 
the final decision by the Supreme Court." The meaning of the 
term "final decision" in that statute has been construed by this 
court in the cases of Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Public S. Com'n., 
142 P.2d 873, and Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 155 P.2d 184, to mean the opinion by the Supreme Court on 
the writ of review and not the decision of the entire controversy. 
In the first Mt. States Tel. & Tel. case, the Public Service 
Commission had entered an order reducing toll rates. Mt. States 
appealed, filed a petition for a stay of the commission's order. 
and posted the required bond. All disputed sums collected by Mt. 
States were impounded. On appeal, the court said: 
The order of the Commission must be set 
aside and the matter remanded to the Commis-
sion for a determination as to what would be 
a reasonable and just rate for intrastate toll 
service. (Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Public Ser. 
Com'n., 142 P.2d 873) 
On remand, Mt. States requested that the Commission release 
to ~t. States the monies in the impounded fund. In answer, the 
commission contended that the court had merely set aside the com-
mission's order and sent the case back to it for further considera-
tion and proceedings, that any further hearing was merely a con-
tinuation of the original case, and that there had been no "final 
decision" within the purview of Section 76-6-17 U.C.A. 1943 (now 
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The refusal of the Commission to release the impounded 
fund led to the second Mt. States Tel. & Tel. case. The precise 
issue was the meaning of "final decision" in the refund statute. 
In holding that "final decision" referred to the decision of the 
Supreme Court on the writ of review, only, and not to the deter-
mination of the entire controversy, the court was addressing a 
situation in which the utility was appealing and had obtained 
the impounding of funds. However, its interpretation of the law 
is pertinent. It said: 
(8) If the foregoing analysis of the statute 
be valid, then any contention to the effect 
that the provision in subsection (3) of Sec. 
76-6-17 that the money be "impounded until 
the final decision of the case," means that 
it be held until the final decision of the 
controversy must fail. It is clear to us 
beyond doubt that such words mean until the 
final decision of the supreme court. The 
words"final decision of the case" themselves 
mean, without any contextual modification, 
the case in the supreme court~that case or 
proceeding initiated by petition for a writ 
of review and concluded by decision of this 
court. 
(9,10) But the contention is made that this 
court did in fact remand the case to the 
Commission "for a determination as to what 
would be a reasonable and just rate for intra-
state toll service" and hence that the case 
is not concluded. The remand, however, was 
obviously merely formal. Ample authority 
exists in the Commission to determine reason-
able rates. The authority comes from.the 
legislature not from this court. It must be 
clear that we did not thus offhandedly assume 
authority which this court has consistently 
asserted was not by the legislature conferred 
upon it. Nor does the fact that by the pro-
visions of Sec. 76-3-1, U.C.A. 1943, every 
unjust and unreasonable charge made by a 
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utility for services is prohibited and made 
unlawful, confer authority upon this court 
to modify an order of the Commission or to 
uphold an order in part and set it aside in 
part. This for the reason that the deter-
mination of whether a rate or charge is 
unreasonable or unjust is placed by law in 
the Commission and not in the courts. 
* * * 
But in the instant case the question of 
the disposition of the fund does not hinge 
alone upon the limited power of review of 
the order of the Commission. That which 
prevents us from holding the fund and sub-
sequently distributing it as equity dictates, 
is the explicit mandate of the legislature, 
unless it be held that despite such mandate 
we may nevertheless exercise such juris-
diction. From the analysis heretofore made 
of the statute in question it seems clear 
that the legislative intent is: (1) That 
the fund be made up of the amounts collected 
by the utility, pending the review, in ex-
cess of those fixed by the order of the 
Commission under review; (2) that upon de-
cision by this court setting aside or affirm-
ing the Commission, no further payments are 
to be made into the fund; (3) that the moneys 
impounded are to be paid to those entitled 
thereto, upon final dicision by this court; 
(4) that such moneys are to be refunded to 
the rate payer only in case the order or de-
cision of the Commission is affirmed; (5) 
that the utility has collected no "over-
charge" if the order or decision of the Com-
mission be set aside; (6) that if there be 
no "overcharge" there is no fund to dis-
tribute. If such be the legislative intent 
then, since in the review proceedings we 
set aside the order of the Commission, there 
is no fund upon which our equitable powers 
may operate. 
Nor can there be any question that the 
legislature might specifically provide for 
disposition of the fund impounded under 
ord~r of the court. It clearly might pre-
scribe that rates fixed by the Commission 
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~e not effec~ive unti~ the period for apply-
ing for a ~...-.. ri t of review shall expire; or 
if petition for such writ be made, until ' 
final disposition thereof by this court. 
There seems no reason, therefore, why it 
might not likewise prescribe that a fund 
collected upon compliance with a condition 
prescribed for a stay be released to the 
utility in case the order of the commission 
be set aside. 
From what has been said it follows that 
the fund in quest1on is the property of the 
plaintiff, and it is the duty of the Commis-
sion to take the necessary steps to release 
it. Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
(Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub. Ser. Com'n., 
155 P.2d 184) 
In the present matter, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
rnanded the order of the Public Service Commission. This was a 
"final decision" within the meaning of 54-7-17(4) and triggered 
the operation of that statute. The Commission was required to 
determine the amount of the refund, the persons to whom refund 
should be made, and order that the refunds "be promptly paid to 
the persons entitled thereto." 
In the present case at hand, it was error for the Commis-
sion not to proceed as required by the statute. 
POINT III. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CANNOT 
IMPOSE RETROACTIVE RATES ON UTILITY 
CUSTOMERS. 
When the Supreme Court reverses an order of the Public 
Service Commission the rates imposed by such order are no longer 
valid. Such rates cannot be reinstated by an amendment purporting 
to have retroactive effect. An attempt to so amend a reversed 
order constitutes retroactive rate making. 
As set forth under the' Statement of Facts, supra, increased 
rates in this matter were authorized by a Public Service Commis-
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sion order dated February 18~ 1977. 
reversed and remanded by this court. 
after without legal affect. 
That order was subsequently 
The reversed order was there-'/ 
,;ti 
The Public Service Commission atempted to give this re-
·,;ij1 
versed order retroactive life by amendment. It amended its pre-
vious finding that a rental expense contract was not in the public 
inte.re~st to a finding that such contract was in the public interest, 
:iH 
Having made this amendment, the Commission then reinstated the 
rates established by the reversed order as of the date of said 
reversed order (February 18, 1977}, and not as of the date of the 
purported amendment (January 11, 1980). 
Under Utah statutes, the Public Service Commission cannot 
impose retroactive rates on utility customers. When the order of 
February 18, 1977 was reversed, the only valid rates which C.P. 
could require its customers to pay were those established by the 
last valid order setting those rates. There was no valid order 
granting any increase from the date of the reversed order {February 
18, 1977) until the date of the next order (May 23, 1978}. 
Section 54-4-4(1) requires that a hearing be held prior to 
setting rates and that such rates can only have prospective effect. 
That Section provides: 
Whenever the commission shall find after 
a hearing that the rates, ... charges or 
classifications, or any of them demanded, 
observed, charged or collected by any public 
utility for any service or product or commodity . 
. . . are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory 
or preferential, or in anyway in violation of 
any provisions of law, or that such rates ... 
are insufficient, the commission shall deter-
mine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates 
.•• to be thereafter observed and in force 
and sh~ll fix the same by order ..•. (emphasis 
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The Supreme Court of California (Pac. Tel. & Tel. v. 
Pub. Serv. Com., 401 P.2d 353), construing Section 728 of that 
state's statutes (and citing numerous decisions from other juris-
dictions) held that the use of the word "thereafter" as used in 
the Utah statute requires that a rate-making order only have 
prospective effect. 
A discussion of retroactive rate making is found in the 
case of La. Power & Light v. La. Public Service Com'n., 377 
So.2d 1023, where the Louisiana court stated: 
Pervading the utility rate making process 
is the fundamental rule that rates are ex-
clusively prospective in application and that 
future rates may not be designed to recoup 
past losses. Transcontinental & Western 
Air Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U.S. 
601, 69 s.ct. 756, 93 L.Ed. 911(1949); Rhode 
Island Consumers' Council v. Smith, 111 R.I. 
271, 302 A.2d 757 (1973); Bebchick v. Wash-
ington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm's, 158 
U.S.App.D.C. 79 485 F.2d 858 (1973). The 
rationale of this principle is that the Com-
mission acts in a legislative capacity in 
exercising its rate making authority; that 
rate making orders have statutory effect; and, 
that, as such, they are subject to the rules 
ordinarily applied in statutory construction. 
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry., 
284 U.S. 370, 52 S .Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
also ruled that to accord a rate order retro-
active effect, requires "the clearest mandate". 
Claridge Apartments co. v. Commission of In-
ternal Revenue, 323 U.S. 141, 65 S.Ct. 172, 89 
L.Ed. 139 (1944). 
Applicability of the principle of non-
retroactivity of rate making orders, has 
been considered in numerous jurisdictions 
all of which recognize the rule that statu-
tory authority is an indispensable prerequisite 
to retroactivity of such orders. City of 
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Miami v. Florida Public Service Conunission, 73 
PUR 3d 369 (Fla. 1968); Re City Water Co. of 
Chattanooga, 84 PUR 3d 287 (Tenn.Pub.Serv. 
comm'n 1970); Democratic Central Committee v. 
' . . . Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 
141 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 436 F.2d 233 (D.C.Cir. 
(1970); New Rochelle Water Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 31 N.Y.2d 397, 340 N.Y.S.2d 617, 
292 N.E.2d 767 (1972); New England Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Conunission, 116 
R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1 (1976); New England 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 362 A.2d 741 (Me. 1976). 
In a 1972 case, the Supreme Court of California (City of 
Los Angeles v. Pub. Ut. Com'n., 497 P.2d 785) discussed a case 
containing legal questions similar to these here under discussion. 
The court stated: 
When the rates set in the ~ecision 
before us are annulled, the on y lawful 
rates are those which were in existence 
prior to the instant decision. We are 
satisfied that to permit the conunission 
to fix new rates for the purpose of 
refunds, as requested by Pacific, would 
involve retroactive rate making in 
violation of the principles recognized 
in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public 
Util. Comm., supra, 62 Cal.2d 634, 649-
656, 44 Cal. Reptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353. The 
basic conclusion that the rates existing 
prior to this proceeding are unreasonable 
as well as the conclusion that increases 
in rates are justified are both based 
on the same defective findings. To permit 
the commission to redetermine whether the 
preexisting rates were unreasonable as of 
the date of its order and to establish 
new rates for the purpose of refunds would 
mean that the commission is establishing 
rates retroactively rather than prospec-
tively. (emphasis added) 
The attempt of the Utah Public Service Commission to amend 
its reversed order, and to base retroactive rates on that amendment 
is void as a matter of law. 
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POINT IV. 
FILING A 11 SUSPENDING BOND 11 IS NOT A 
PREREQUISITE TO OBTAINING A REFUND OF 
REVENUES COLLECTED BY A PUBLIC UTILITY 
PURSUANT TO AN INVALID ORDER OF THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. 
It was urged before the Public Service Conunission that a 
refund could not be granted in this matter because on the original 
appeal the Appellants had not filed a "suspending bond." It is 
submitted that the filing of a 11 suspending bond" is not a prerequi-
site to obtaining a refund of revenues paid by customers to a 
utility pursuant to an invalid conunission order. A "suspendinging 
bond" must be filed only if a stay order is requested on the 
grounds that "great and irreparable damage would ... result to the 
petitioner"· if the stay is not granted. If no stay is requested, 
no bond is required. This is clearly established by an analysis 
of Sections 54-7-16 and 54-7-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as · 
amended. 
Section 54-7-16, U.C.A. 1953, provides that an applicant 
for a rate increase uor any party to the proceeding deeming himself 
aggrieved. . .may apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari" 
to review an order of the Public Service Commission. However, the 
filing of such a writ "does not of itself stay or suspend the 
operation of the order." (54-7-17(1)) 
Section 54-7-17(2) enunciates the only condition under which 
a commission order may be stayed or suspended. That condition is: 
upon evidence submitted to the court. 
that great or irreparable damage would other-
wise result to the petitioner ... 
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~: 
It is apparent that the legislature did not anticipate th~-
a customer of a public utility would suffer "great or irreparable ~ 
damage" because of an increase in his monthly utility rates. It 
is equally apparent that it was anticipated that a utility might ~t 
suffer such damage if it wer~ to be precluded from collecting ~ 
millions of dollars in revenue while the legality of an order was 11 
being reviewed. 
The 1945 case of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub.Ser.Com. 
155 P. 2d 184 (cited under Point II of this argument) illustrates 
the operation of the Utah law. In that case the order of the 
Public Service co~mission h~d reduced the rates that could be 
charged by the utility. The utility appealed the order. Pending 
appeal, and after filing a "suspending bond," the effect of the 
order was stayed because of the "great and irreparable damage" the 
utility might suffer if it were to lose the revenue occasioned 
by the lower rates during the appeal process. By providing a 
"suspending bond," the utility was permitted to collect the full 
~cunt of its rates which were in effect prior to the commission 
order rather than the reduced rates required by that order. How-
ever, the amount the utility collected in excess of the sum a 
customer would have been compelled to pay if the order of the 
commission had not been stayed was impounded pending a decision 
by this court. 
The procedure is set forth in Section 17-7-17(3), U.C.A. 
1953. In the event the Supreme Court grants a stay or suspends an, 
order, the court "?hall also by order direct the public utility 
affected to pay .,into court. • . all st:=:: ~= . ,.\.....: _,_ : .._ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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collect from any person in excess of the sum such person would 
have been compelled to pay, if the order or decision of the 
commission had not been stayed or suspended." This is the only 
provision regarding the necessity of a "suspending bond'' in con-
nection with the repayment of revenues collected pursuant to a 
commission order under appeal. The full text of Section 54-7-17(3) 
is as follows: 
(3) In case the order or decision of the 
commission is stayed or suspended, the order 
of the court shall not become effective until 
a suspending bond shall first have been executed 
and filed with and approved by the commission 
(or approved, on review, by the Supreme Court) 
payable to the state of Utah, and sufficient 
in amount and security to ensure the prompt 
payment by the party petitioning for the review 
of all damages caused by the delay in the en-
forcement of the order or decision of the com-
mission, and of all moneys which any person or 
corporation may be compelled to pay, pending 
the review proceedings, for transportation, 
t~ansmission, product_, cow.nodity or service in 
excess of the charges fixed by the order or 
decision of the commission, in case said order 
or decision is sustained. The Supreme Court 
in case it stays or suspends the order or 
decision of the commission in any matter 
affecting rates, fares, tolls, rentals, 
charges or classifications, shall also by 
order direct the public utility affected to 
~into court from time to time, there to be 
impounded until the final decision of the 
case, or into some bank or trust company pay-
ing interest on deposits, under such condi-
tions as the court may prescribe, all sums 
of money which it may collect-from any person 
in excess of the sum such person would have 
been compelled to pay, if the order or 
decision of the commission had not been 
stayed or suspended. (emphasis added) 
In determining the significance of case law dealing with 
utility refunds, the wording of the statutes involved is important. 
The wording of Utah and Colorado laws governing such refunds are 
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almost identical. The principle difference is that the Colorado 
statute (40-6-116, C.R.S. 1973, formerly 115-6-16, C.R.S. 1963) 
places jurisdiction in the district court and the Utah statute 
(54-7-17) places jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. The same 
requirements exist as to "suspending bonds." 
In the 1972 case of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm., the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether or not a "suspending bond" was necessary in refund cases. 
There the court said (502 P.2d 945, ~49 (Colo. 1972)): 
Mountain Bell has emphasized the fact that 
the 1969 rate order was not suspended under 
bond during appeal, pursuant to C.R.S. 1963, 
115-6-16 (amended in 1969) . This statute pro-
vides that a party petitioning for review of 
a rate order may have the order stayed pending 
appeal after a finding that "great or irrepar-
able damage would otherwise result to the 
petitioner" and after the party petitioning 
for review has filed a suspending bond which 
will ensure the prompt payment "of all 
damages caused by the delay in the enforce-
ment of the order or decision of the commission." 
The original version of 115-6-16 (L. 13, p. 498, 
§ 53) is substantially similar to the present 
section. This original version was interpreted 
in Denver & S.L.R. Co. v. C.B. & Q.R. Co., 67 
Colo. 155, 185 P. 817 (1919), to be permissive 
only. It was stated that suspension of a 
Commission order was not a mandatory require-
ment for appellate review of the order, and 
that the commission may order restitution in 
a proper case. Amendments to the original 
version of the statute do not provide any 
basis for altering this interpretation. (emph. add.) 
It is apparent from the foregoing that a customer of c.P. 
is not required to post a "suspending bond" in order to obtain a 
refund of rates paid pursuant to an invalid order of the Public 
Service Commission. 
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POINT V. 
UTILITY CUSTOMERS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION WILL BE VIOLATED IF 
THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH THIS 
APPEAL AND OBTAIN A REFUND. 
A basic concept of law is that statutes are not to be con-
strued so as to discriminate -between the affluent and the poor. 
If Section 54-7-17, U.C.A. 1953, is to be construed as requiring 
customers of"c.P."to file a "suspending bond" in order to obtain 
a refund of rates paid to "C. P ." pursuant to an invalid order of 
the Public Service Commission, although a stay of the order is not 
requested, the constitutional rights of those customers will have 
been violated. 
In order to obtain a stay (thus making mandatory the filing 
of a "suspending bond") a customer would be required to convince 
the court that he would suffer "great or irreparable damage." 
(54-7-17(2), U.C.A. 1953) It is problematical that being required 
to pay increased monthly utility rates would constitute "great 
or irreparable damage." 
However, assuming, arguendo, that "great or irreparable 
damage" could be shown by a customer, few would be able to afford 
a "suspending bond." Such a bond would have to be "sufficient in 
amount and security to ensure the prompt payment by the party 
petitioning for the review of all damages caused by the delay in 
the enforcement of the order or decision of the commission, and of 
all moneys which any person or corporation may be compelled to pay, 
pending review proceedings, for transportation, transmission, 
product, commodity or service in excess of the charges fixed by 
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the order or decision of the commission, in case said order or 
decision is sustained." (54-7-17(3) U.C.A. 1953) It is obvious 
that the cost of a "suspending bond" to a customer would greatly 
exceed any refund of increased monthly rates he might receive. 
Such an interpretation would permit an affluent corporation 
to obtain relief under the law while denying relief to the 
unaffluent. 
By virtue of a clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States expressly forbidding it to do 
so, a state may not deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. City of St. Petersburg v. 
Alsup, 77 S.Ct. 680, 353 U.S. 922. 
The fourteenth amendment and laws adopted under its 
authority embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in 
the United States shall abide in any state on equality of legal 
privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws. 
Takahaski v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138 
Various broad and sweeping generalizations and statements 
as to the meaning of this important part of the Constitution have 
from time to time been enunciated. The guiding principle most 
often stated by the courts is that the constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection of the laws requires that all persons shall 
·be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. Hartfo~ 
Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 
57 s.ct 838 
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With the above principles as the criteria, the argument 
is forwarded that a party who cannot afford the bond necessary to 
participate in a utility appeal may have been denied both the 
equal protection and due process requirements of the law. 
It is generally stated that the Constitution is no respector 
of the financial status of persons, and the rich and poor alike 
are to be accorded equal rights under it. Moreover the mere 
presence of wealth,or lack thereof, in a party or citizen cannot 
be the basis for valid discrimination. Schilbv. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 
357, 92 S.Ct. 479; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 3 
As to the present case at hand, the practical reality of 
mandatorily requiring prompt payment by a petitioning party in a 
utility action is a burdensome, onerous and inequitable one and 
no rational reason exists to support it. 
Under .general laws, the requirement of set filing fees, 
set bond fees in state and federal courts and other various 
financial obligations for use of the court and administrative 
systems is rational and the state may legitimately attempt to 
limit its expenditures. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 
S.Ct. 1848; Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479. Further 
parties using the courts and administrative systems of the state 
or federal government should generally be encouraged to assist in 
allaying portions of such costs. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 
93 s.ct. 1112 
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A very different setting and situation arises though when 
parties are required to match the costs of a public utilities 
organization, which may include expenses of attorneys, accountants,: 
management personnel, support staff and countless outside expert 
witnesses. Matching the bill in advance for such an "expedition" 
would certainly bankrupt any potential residential consumer or 
party engaged in small commercial enterprises in the State of Utah. 
As long as the state utilizes the criterion of ability to. 
pay as a condition to being allowed to challenge a utility action, 
and since there is no rational justification in requiring all 
petitioning parties to pay prior to gaining court access, this 
court in line with the general pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the cases of Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 3 71, 91 S. Ct. 
780; Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.ct. 1315, Griffin v. 
Illinois 351 U.S. 958, 76 S.Ct.585, __ Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 
S.Ct. 1164, Gidion v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 
should conclude that no rational basis exists for mandatorily 
requiring parties to obtain a suspending bond if they wish to 
challenge the activities of a utility. This is particularly true 
when no stay of an order is requested. 
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POINT VI. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 4, 5 AND 6 AND THE CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW ARE ARBITRARY, UNSUPPORTED BY 
EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE SUPREME COURT 
DECISION. 
A. The Commission merely changed its mind without evi-
dence or justification. 
The Comraission, in· the first hearing, had made exten-
sive Findings of Fact in which it clearly held that the Wheeling 
Agreement in question had not been submitted to the Commission, 
had not been approved and that it was not in the best public in-
terest or in the interest of the customers. The Supreme Court 
commented extensively upon such Findings and concluded that the 
Order issued by the Commission was inconsistent with said Find-
ings. 
The Commission now, in the Order before this Court in 
Finding No. 4, states as the reason for now reversing its exten-
sive Findings made earlier that, 
"The reason for the inconsistency is that the Find-
ings did not correctly and completely set forth the 
basis for the Commission's Order. The Report and 
Order was inartfully drawn and was hastily issued 
under the pressures of a heavy case load of hear-
ings and paper work. The Commission has carefully 
deliberated in determining the decision to be made 
in this case." 
The Finding of Fact obviously is not supported by any evidence. 
The only evidence supporting any Findings was given at the orig-
inal hearings and was the foundation for the extensive Findings 
to the effect that the Agreement and thus the increased costs 
were not in the public interest nor in the interest of the con-
sumers of Cal-Pac, i.e. the ·Protestants herein. Such a Finding 
now with the Order affirming same on appeal is thus arbitrary 
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without any evidence to support same. Without any proper evi-
dence, the Findings and Conclusions of Law simply deprive Pro-
testants of the Findings to which Protestants are entitled and 
which are necessary under the procedures and under the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah governing such cases. Logan City 
vs. Public Utilities Commission, 77 Utah 442, 296 Pac. 1006. 
B. The Commission's Findings and Order violate the 
intent of the Supreme Court decision. 
The Supreme Court, in its prior decision on this mat-
ter, clearly intended that the Cornmission would abide by its 
Findings and would make the Conclusions and Order consistent 
therewith. Several factors lead us to this conclusion. 
1. Section 54-7-16 provides, 
"The Findings and Conclusions of the Commission 
on questions of fact shall be final and shall not 
be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall 
include ultimate facts and the Findings and Conclu-
sions of the Commission on reasonableness and dis-
crimination •.••• Upon the hearing, the Supreme 
Court shall enter judgment either affirming or 
setting aside the Order or decision of the Commis-
sion •.•.•• " 
It is abundantly clear from the detail examination of the Corn-
mission's Findings by this Court that there was no intent what-
soever to disturb said Findings. The Findings were clear and 
were amply supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court simply 
did not intend to reverse the Findings, and in fact, would not 
attempt to do this under the statute and under the many cases 
previously handed down by this Court. Bamburger Electric Rail-
road Company vs. Public Utilities Commission, 59 Utah 351, 204 
Pac. 314; Utah Light and Transit Company vs. Public Service Co!!!:_ 
mission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 and more recently Greyhound 
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2. The language in the Supreme Court Order is 
clear in evidencing the intent to make the Commission Order 
conform to the Findings - and not to make the Findings confo_rm 
to the Order. After reciting its approval of the detailed 
Findings of Fact, the Supreme Court stated, 
"In its Order, the-Commission nevertheless granted 
53.03% of the requested increase and ordered Cal-
Pac to negotiate with the Bureau for an increase 
in the Wheeling rate ....• 
The Commission's Order is not supported by its 
Findings, and in fact is hostile to them. The 
Findings and Order are irreconcilable and that 
irreconcilability is fatal. The Commission found 
that the U P & L contract was not in the public 
interest, but based a rate increase on the terms 
of that contract." 
The Supreme Court then invited the Comrnisson to 
hold further hearings if necessary to achieve the harmonious 
relationship between the Findings and Order. 
The language seems clear that the Supreme Court 
intended that the Order be changed to fit the Findings. Any 
contrary intent would have to have been made upon some deter-
. mination that the Findings of the Commission were arbitrary or 
capricious and are not supported by the evidence whatsoever. 
Obviously, such a decision was not made by the Supreme Court. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Commission did not 
follow the mandate of the Supreme Court in changing the Order 
to fit the Findings, but to the contrary modified the Findings, 
without any additional evidence, to fit the Order. Such action 
on the part of the Commission is arbitrary and without any ra-
tional basis whatsoever. The Commission's Findings thus made 
without proper evidence and based only upon its statement that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it was hurried into making a prior Finding is not a proper 
basis for depriving the Protestants of their rights and impos-
ing the additional assessments upon them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons which have been set forth above, Ap-
pellants urge this Court to reverse the Report and Order of the 
Commission authorizing the appropriate refund of all payments 
made under the prior ruling of the Commission and reversing the 
Order of the Commission to make it consistent with the Findings 
of Fact previously made to the effect that the contract with 
Utah Power and Light was not in the public interest and could 
not, therefore, be the basis for a rate increase. 
The action of the Commission in its Report and Order 
here under review is not only inconsistent with the statutes,. 
but is clearly arbitrary and deprives the consumers of their 
property rights without a proper evidentiary hearing. 
1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this cZ)"~day of~ 
am s L. B er 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Committee of Consumer 
Services 
El tt Lee 
CLYDE & PRATT 
Attorney for Protestants, Plain-
tiffs herein 
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